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When Torts Met Civil Procedure: A
Curricular Coupling
Brigham A. Fordham, Laura G. Dooley, and Ann E. Woodley
I. Introduction
In the iconic movie When Harry Met Sally, the main characters live their lives
in separate, albeit overlapping, orbits. Content through most of their young
adult lives to pursue their separate journeys, they ﬁnd their mutual fate only
when their orbits collide, and they merge their lives. The movie is a he said/she
said account; Harry and Sally recall the evolution of their relationship through
the lens of perspectives unique to each. The viewer understands the richness of
the story only because those perspectives are presented together.
Is there a lesson here for those seeking to improve their law school
curriculum? Bringing together diﬀerent viewpoints is one of the callings and
challenges of legal education. We often think of this calling in terms of teaching
students how to recognize the diﬀerent roles and views of the people involved
(or excluded) in litigating a case. But law students must also become adept at
understanding how various bodies of law interact—supporting, balancing, and
even conﬂicting with each other. Just as the people and institutions involved in
litigation bring diﬀerent values and history to social problems, so too diﬀerent
areas of law bring with them rich historical and policy traditions. As others
have noted,1 teaching students isolated areas of law leaves students unprepared
for practice. When we teach students how the separate topics they study in law
school ﬁt together, they can better put abstract concepts into practical use and
recognize overarching concepts that animate many diﬀerent areas of the law.
This article describes an attempt to achieve these goals by merging two
canonical ﬁrst-year courses, civil procedure and torts, into an integrated class
titled Introduction to Civil Litigation. Our most pressing motivation was
concern that students who study civil procedure and torts in isolation develop
a skewed, unrealistic view of how law works in the real world. By combining
these courses, we hoped to teach students early in their careers to approach
problems more like practicing lawyers, who must deal with multiple bodies of
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See, e.g., Kris Franklin, Do We Need Subject Matter-Specific Pedagogies?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 839, 861
(2016).
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law simultaneously. And while the course did yield a higher level of practice
readiness, the experience also brought unexpected rewards to both students
and faculty. As we developed and reﬁned the course, we discovered that we
were not just merging two courses. We were bringing together two diﬀerent
perspectives on how the law functions. We came to believe that more can be
gained by viewing torts and civil procedure together than by studying them
apart. Like Harry and Sally, torts and civil procedure tell diﬀerent sides of the
same story.
The insights gleaned after four years teaching the merged civil litigation
course are potentially useful to faculty teaching torts or civil procedure,
whether the instruction is delivered in an integrated or traditional course
setting. Part II of the article brieﬂy recounts the odyssey of our decision to
merge torts and civil procedure into one integrated course. Part III describes
how we used the course to broaden student understanding of foundational
doctrines through the interweaving of procedural and substantive law. In Part
IV, we discuss how our approach to the course facilitated active, contextual
learning and introduced students to both practical applications and bar-type
assessments. Finally, Part V lays the groundwork for the future of our noble
experiment and oﬀers some suggestions to colleagues in the academy who
might consider teaching a similar course or enhancing a stand-alone course.
Kris Franklin’s recent piece in the Journal of Legal Education calls for law
teachers to consider both how their individual courses can best convey the
essential concepts that students need to understand about a particular ﬁeld
and more broadly how the course ﬁts within the “ ‘gorgeous mosaic’ of the
law itself.”2 She posits that “each law school class [has] something unique to
contribute to the larger enterprise of teaching law students the process of law
itself,” and suggests that law schools might better capture those contributions
by coordinating among courses in the curriculum.3 Our project begins to
answer that call in a concrete, and, we believe, fruitful way.
II. A Civil Union
Critics in and out of the legal academy have long bemoaned the relative
dearth of practical training provided by the traditional Langdellian curriculum,
with its emphasis on case studies of appellate opinions and relegation of
practical skills to courses often taught by nontenure-track and adjunct faculty.4
2.

Id. at 861. The “gorgeous mosaic” phrase is a reference to New York Mayor David Dinkins’s
imagery describing cultural integration in the city. See The Mosaic Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1990, at A18. Professor Franklin intriguingly uses the phrase to describe the richness and
complexity of the law as an overarching system that law students need to understand to be
fully prepared as attorneys.

3.

Franklin, supra note 1, at 862 (Professor Franklin notes that “[f]ollowing the principles of
intentional design, the more we articulate the ways each of the core academic subjects in law
school adds to students’ overall learning, the more we can tailor our teaching to accentuate
those features.” (footnote omitted)).

4.

See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 621
(2008).
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The ABA’s MacCrate Report sounded an alarm that has been repeated many
times since its 1992 publication.5 Legal employers now demand that new
hires bring with them better training in the nuts and bolts of law practice.6
Law schools have responded by including more practical experiences in
their curricula and by infusing practice-oriented exercises into foundational
courses. Nonetheless, the actual structure of the ﬁrst-year curriculum has yet
to undergo a signiﬁcant and sustained change.7 Some schools have added
coursework or merged a writing course with a doctrinal subject,8 but the
great majority of ﬁrst-year students will encounter separate silos of doctrinal
content, each subject formally cast as a universe unto itself.
Breaking with the time-honored structure of the ﬁrst year took a leap of
faith. While it seems intuitively true that the silos of ﬁrst-year courses create
an artiﬁcial legal world for students, breaking down and merging traditionally
distinct courses required a reevaluation of the content of each course. Indeed,
we discovered that teaching the integrated courses, particularly because the
three of us had long taught one course but not the other, caused us to think
very diﬀerently about subjects regarding which we had considered ourselves
experts.
Most teachers of civil procedure struggle to explain enough of the substantive
context of the cases they teach to make the procedural holdings salient to their
students. And torts teachers struggle with having to explain the procedural
posture of torts cases. We expected that our approach would diminish these
problems, and it did, but the lessons we learned went far beyond those limited
beneﬁts. We discovered that combining the courses gave students a better,
more realistic understanding of the systemic operations of legal institutions.
5.

See TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AM. BAR ASS’N,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP
(1992); Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 744, 761 (2016)
(describing the call to action, including the need for “context-based” learning); David B.
Oppenheimer, Using a Simulated Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: The Ninety-Percent Solution, 65 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 817, 819 (2016) (“The MacCrate report, the Carnegie report, Best Practices
for Legal Education, Transforming the Education of Lawyers, and many articles published
here in our peer-reviewed Journal of Legal Education and elsewhere encourage us to provide our
students with opportunities to simulate or practice lawyering skills.” (footnotes omitted)).

6.

See, e.g., Sean Patrick Farrell, The Lincoln Lawyers: Bypassing Law School on Your Way to the Bar, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014, at 22; Peter A. Joy, Law Schools and the Legal Profession: A Way Forward, 47
AKRON L. REV. 177, 179–80 (2014).

7.

See Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 760 (“While [law schools] have expanded upper-division
oﬀerings to include more practical-skills classes and problem-solving courses, the ﬁrst-year
curriculum (and teaching of that curriculum) has generally changed little.”); Michael B.
Mushlin & Lisa Margaret Smith, The Professor and the Judge: Introducing First-Year Students to
the Law in Context, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 460, 462 (2014) (“The ﬁrst year of law school, and
particularly the ﬁrst semester, with a few notable exceptions, remains unchanged at most
schools.” (footnote omitted)).

8.

See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 821 n.25 (surveying law schools that combine writing
and civil procedure).
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A. Developing the Course
We chose to combine civil procedure with torts in part because many of the
major civil procedure cases are based on an underlying tort claim. In practice,
this occasional subject-matter overlap provided some convenience in teaching
but was not a major beneﬁt. The best part of combining the subjects was the
way the accessibility of torts provided familiar ground on which to scaﬀold
less accessible procedural doctrines. The media frequently report on claims of
fraud, product defects, and high-proﬁle wrongful-death actions. Most people
have experienced a tort, whether litigated or not, in the form of a car accident
or defective product. And, thanks to contingency fees in personal-injury cases,
tort litigation reaches many who would not otherwise engage the judicial
system. Tort lawyers are almost as common on television as criminal lawyers.
The prominence of torts in pop culture provides both a familiar entry point
and a sharp contrast to the less accessible world of civil procedure.
Some of our colleagues vehemently opposed integrating torts with civil
procedure in one course, worried that the course would be more than ﬁrstyear students could handle. Interestingly, when we spoke with practicing
attorneys and second- and third-year law students about the course, they
were overwhelmingly positive, saying, “I wish I had learned civil procedure
like that.” They felt, in particular, that teaching civil procedure in a vacuum
made it too abstract to be useful; they did not understand how important civil
procedure was until they tried to use it in a practical setting.
Ultimately, the doubters and the believers were both right—to a degree.9
Especially in the beginning, students struggled to ﬁnd continuity as we
moved from a torts topic to a civil procedure topic and back again; certainly,
for the professors, teaching the integrated course took extra time (partially
because there was no ready-made casebook or syllabus).10 Those students who
surmounted these issues were able to better understand the way substantive
law and procedural law are necessarily linked. Their depth of knowledge
also increased through practical exercises and assessments that required an
understanding of both areas of law at once.
At ﬁrst, we structured the course by teaching a civil procedure topic followed
by a congruent torts topic, followed by a practicum that required students to
use both areas of law in a single project. We would then study a new set of
torts and civil procedure topics, followed by a practicum that attempted to
pull together all the topics that we had covered so far in the course. Over time,
9.

Student responses to the course varied over four years. In anonymous course evaluations,
students often identiﬁed civil litigation as their most diﬃcult ﬁrst-year course. This could
suggest that the course was too much for ﬁrst-year students or that they were challenged
and grew to meet expectations. Many also described it as their favorite class. The ﬁrst year
we taught the course, some students commented in surveys that torts and civil procedure
should be taught separately. These comments varied in future years. We describe here what
seemed to work best based on student feedback and our own impressions.

10.

We created a syllabus and a custom casebook (described in more detail below) that combined
torts and civil procedure materials from other texts.
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we tweaked the order of topics to better leverage synergies and to balance the
relative diﬃculty of the subjects. Also, we reﬁned the practicums, integrated
them more into the substantive aspects of the course, and increasingly used the
same underlying fact scenarios as simulations to attack topics from diﬀerent
angles.11 By the third time we taught the course, the torts and procedure topics
seemed to ﬁt together naturally.
B. Unexpected Second Order Effects
One of the best parts of uniting these courses, for us, was the way it expanded
our perspective on the topics we thought we knew. Two of us have taught civil
procedure for many years (but not torts) and the third has taught torts for
many years (but not civil procedure). To get up to speed, we met regularly to
brief each other on the subjects and coordinate teaching approaches.
We realized quickly that as faculty members with focused areas of expertise,
we had become unnecessarily and unhealthily siloed. As professors, we know
what we know and have explained it enough times that it makes perfect sense to
us. In explaining our well-worn topics to a colleague, we discovered that years
of teaching had led us to approach the law from very diﬀerent perspectives.
Our own reactions as we ventured outside our academic comfort zones gave
us a better appreciation for the challenges students face when attempting to
digest these diﬀerent bodies of law.
For those of us who had taught civil procedure but not torts, for example,
the ﬁeld of torts initially seemed frustratingly squishy. Having taught the
historical development of doctrines mainly through United States Supreme
Court cases, the proceduralists among us struggled to ﬁnd coherence in
an array of tort cases drawn from many diﬀerent state courts, each with no
obligation to follow the reasoning of other state courts or even that of such
inﬂuential institutions like the American Law Institute. Also troubling was the
lack of a consistent lexicon in torts. Terms like cause in fact, proximate cause,
duty, and breach can have diﬀerent meanings for diﬀerent courts, and even
among diﬀerent jurists on the same court. And though students must learn
well-established tort “elements” in any torts class, those elements are far from
distinct. Duty bleeds into breach, breach into causation.12 Element “creep”
matters greatly to the proceduralist, who is keenly aware that the division of
11.

We also found that assigning students a practicum before studying a topic helped to focus
students’ attention. As with the familiar “treasure hunt” approach, students engaged with
material by looking for answers to mock clients’ concrete questions and needs. This, of
course, better mimics the practice of law.

12.

Of course, from the perspective of a torts professor, the apparent disorder of tort doctrine
is what makes it great for teaching legal reasoning. In torts we attempt to ﬁnd uniform
rules across a ﬁeld of diverse cases, and in the process draw arguments and policy rationales
from a deep pool of common-law thought. In torts, there is rarely a “right” answer to a
legal question; instead there are but guideposts that can be used to test students’ ability to
think critically and recognize unconscious assumptions. Students practice being counselors,
identifying strong and weak arguments, as we spin hypotheticals that slightly alter the facts.
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decision-making authority between judge and jury varies according to the
element.
Those of us who had taught torts but not civil procedure often found the
procedure cases simultaneously rigid and indecisive. In studying personal
jurisdiction, for example, the cases purport to be asserting a consistent
philosophy—due process—yet over time the rules shift and are redeﬁned by the
Supreme Court. History eclipses doctrine as the Court circumlocutes prior
cases to catch up with social, economic, and philosophical changes in society.
Far from the ﬂexibility of the common law, civil procedure demands uniform
application of its rules and statutes within all geographies of the federal courts.
Additionally, for a torts professor who is used to teaching that legal questions
rarely have a “right” answer, it was disorienting to ﬁnd that, particularly when
it comes to codiﬁed civil procedure rules, there often is a right answer to
procedural questions.
We were surprised to ﬁnd how often our diﬀerent doctrinal predilections
aﬀected how we taught the subjects. The procedure teachers found themselves
focusing on decision points and due-process problems that would otherwise
receive little attention in a torts course. Those who have spent more time
studying common-law claims could not help but question the venerable
line of civil procedure cases that propound far-reaching federal policies that
sometimes fail to provide individual justice. The collaborative process of
creating the course evoked new perspectives, challenged the assumptions we
made in teaching our courses, and helped us better understand why students
struggle to ﬁnd connections in these two distinct, yet interconnected areas
of law.13 We found that while there is value in teaching courses in our areas
of expertise, broadening our understanding enabled us to deliver a more
balanced perspective to students.
III. Substantive Integration: Leveraging Congruences and Conflicts
Merging torts and civil procedure compels students to recognize the ways
that tort law and civil procedure inevitably intersect in the practice of law.
One cannot litigate a torts case without knowledge of court procedures, and
court procedures have no meaning without a theory for relief. But beyond
this practical connection, the substantive doctrines of tort law often animate
the rules and policies that propel civil procedure. We attempted to leverage
the inherent practical and doctrinal interactions between these two bodies of
law to give the concepts depth. Where the law merges, we helped students
ﬁnd cohesion. Where the law conﬂicts, we found opportunities to sharpen
distinctions.
By expressly noting the places where civil procedure and tort law intersect—
and more importantly the interdependence of the two bodies of law—we sought
to give students a well-rounded understanding of how the law functions. We
13.

On several occasions throughout the semester we held “joint” classes of all of our students
and took turns leading the class on a topic on which we had a particular expertise. By doing
so, we modeled collaboration and professional respect and civility to our students.
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found the most profound pedagogical connections came in teaching four
recurring themes: a) the function and challenges of federalism; b) attempts
to provide fair limits on a defendant’s liability and amenability to suit; c)
the importance of the identity of the decision-maker; and d) the impact of
procedural posture in evaluating the merits of a case.
A. Facts, Federalism, and Forum Shopping
Teaching torts and civil procedure in one course gave us unique opportunities
to help students more fully appreciate the practical import of federalism. As
students repeatedly encountered tort claims that vary from state to state and
due-process mandates that permeate all U.S. courts, they learned to recognize
the diﬀerent functions and powers of the state and federal court systems. In
the combined course, we pointed out and tested these distinctions by asking
students to explain the impact a case would have on other courts faced with
similar facts in diﬀerent jurisdictions.
Early in the course, students noticed a stylistic diﬀerence between torts
and civil procedure cases. The foundational civil procedure cases students
read in their ﬁrst year tend to be long and deep, often written by the U.S.
Supreme Court, and are thick on policy and thin on facts. Because these cases
address rules and concepts that have nationwide implications, the policy
considerations often take precedence over the particular dispute that happens
to have brought the case to the forum.14
As we shifted topics, students found torts cases are often the opposite.15
Signiﬁcant shifts in doctrine rarely come through a single case in a single
jurisdiction and (unless free speech is involved)16 do not carry the voice of
the U.S. Supreme Court. In torts cases, the facts are the main event; it often
seems that the rules are twisted and torn to meet the more immediate demands
of local, particularized justice. Courts are free to distinguish similar cases
based on small factual diﬀerences, or even a mere diﬀerence in perspective.
Torts jargon is often expressed diﬀerently from case to case, requiring students
to accept that decisions don’t always mean what they say; in some places, a
court means “cause in fact” even though it says “proximate cause,”17 assault
and battery are two diﬀerent torts even though some courts use the terms
14.

For a famous example, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (plaintiﬀ, who lost
his arm by walking on a path next to railroad tracks, had his $30,000 jury verdict overturned
in a deeply philosophical opinion in which the Supreme Court only tangentially recounted
the facts).

15.

The stylistic diﬀerences can frustrate students if they try to read and brief both kinds of cases
the same way. We found it helpful to give students guidance in advance on how to approach
the cases. Speciﬁcally, in torts cases students should be working to synthesize general rules
and exceptions that span jurisdictions. In procedure cases, students should be looking for
shifts and clariﬁcations as they piece together the historical development of doctrines.

16.

See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

17.

See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920); Haft v. Lone Palm
Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 468 (Cal. 1970); Zalazar v. Vercimak, 633 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (Ill. App.
1993); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d. 1, 2 (Cal. 1948).

270

Journal of Legal Education

interchangeably,18 and “intent” has various meanings depending on which tort
is being alleged.19
As students encountered these stylistic diﬀerences, we drew their attention
to an underlying lesson about federalism. The reason torts cases can slide
from one voice to another is that the voices belong to separate sovereigns.
Because each state is free, in our judicial system, to develop its tort law within
very loose constitutional constraints,20diﬀerent states can and do reach wildly
diﬀerent conclusions on similar facts. Yet procedural law, even as applied in
state courts, is much more tightly constrained by the federal Constitution.
For example, due process, a major theme in ﬁrst-year procedure, imposes
requirements on state sovereigns when they seek to exercise power over tort
defendants. Thus, a state court may have the power to choose whether to
impose tort liability, but must conform to federal requirements as to whether it
can subject a tort defendant to its power in the ﬁrst place.21 Understanding this
dichotomy is useful to students, practitioners, and faculty alike. Students learn
that in both tort and procedural law settings, clients need to be advised to
structure their behavior to avoid liability for claims in their home jurisdiction
and in jurisdictions that have unfavorable laws. As students repeatedly see
the interaction between tort claims that vary from state to state and dueprocess mandates that permeate all U.S. courts, they more fully appreciate the
functions of federalism.
B. Conquering the Enigmatic “F” Word
In tort law, the word “foreseeable” does far more work than any single
word should be expected to do.22 Torts professors spend considerable time
attempting to unwind the mystery of that overused and ill-deﬁned word.
We ask what must be foreseeable, to whom it must be foreseeable, and from
18.

See, e.g., Grabowski v. Quigley, 684 A.2d 610, 615 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Smith v.
Yohe, 194 A.2d 167, 174 (Pa. 1963)).

19.

See, e.g., PAULA J. MANNING, TORTS: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK, at 16 (“The required
consequence [that must be intended] is diﬀerent for each of the intentional torts.”).

20.

The U.S. Constitution’s constraints on the development of state tort law are very limited.
See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), on punitive damages.

21.

In addition, federal courts are subject to a uniform set of procedural rules, and a majority of
state procedural systems model the federal rules.

22.

Foreseeability comes up most prominently in discussing proximate cause, but issues of
foreseeability lurk within the framework of other tort concepts, such as duty and breach.
Famously, Palsgraf teaches that the railroad company whose employee helps a passenger
onto a train, resulting in a package exploding, owes no duty to a woman standing farther
down the platform because she is not a foreseeable plaintiﬀ. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). In another famous case, Judge Learned Hand slips “probability”
into his cost-beneﬁt analysis of breach, United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947), which inevitably morphs into foreseeable likelihood. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (Am. Law Inst. 2010). The Third
Restatement of Torts retreats from using “foreseeability” in its test for proximate cause,
instead invoking the “risks rule”; but that rule, the Restatement authors note, envelops the
foreseeability rule that has long dominated proximate cause analysis. Id. at § 29 cmt.
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what point in time it should be measured. Because the word is so imprecise,
torts professors often challenge students to explain proximate cause without
resorting to the “F” word.23
In teaching civil litigation, we found that comparing the tort concept of
foreseeability with the “foreseeability” necessary for due-process analysis
brought both concepts into greater relief. The comparison was helpful in two
respects. First, students understood the individual doctrines better when they
were required to articulate how the concepts functioned diﬀerently. Second, the
doctrines made sense to students as they recognized a common-sense policy of
fairness to the defendant that underlies “foreseeability” in both arenas.
After students had been challenged with the “F” word in studying negligence
or products liability, we returned to the question in personal jurisdiction. A
good starting point is the following passage from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, a staple of civil procedure courses:
Yet “foreseeability” alone has never been a suﬃcient benchmark for personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.
....
. . . This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant.
But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will ﬁnd its way into the forum State. Rather, it is
that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled [sic] into court there. 24

Parsing the Supreme Court’s language provides an opportunity to compare
the tort conception of foreseeability with “the kind of foreseeability that is
critical to due process analysis.”25 In both contexts, courts are attempting
to identify fair limits on the burden that an imperfect judicial system places
upon defendants. Yet in each context, foreseeability serves a diﬀerent master.
The examples the Court gives in World-Wide of situations in which personal
jurisdiction is absent make good hypotheticals to test whether students
understand proximate cause:
If foreseeability were the criterion, a local California tire retailer could be
forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there . . . ; a Wisconsin
seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled [sic] before a distant court
for damage caused in New Jersey . . . ; or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire
could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries happening there . . . .26

One can easily come up with hypotheticals that illustrate the reverse:
situations in which due process is satisﬁed and proximate cause prevents
23.

We intend this to mean “foreseeability,” though other words may come to mind in the stress
of the moment.

24.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

25.

Id. at 295, 297.

26.

Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
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liability.27 To push the distinction, one can ask students what a defendant can
do to avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction in another state. Then ask
what, if anything, that same defendant could do to avoid having plaintiﬀ’s
damages fall within the limits of proximate cause. Students begin to see the
diﬀerence between voluntary acts that make something “foreseeable” in the
civil procedure context and the more abstract foreseeable harm that attaches
when a defendant takes a negligent act. The “F” word is too ephemeral
by itself to answer proximate-cause or minimum-contacts questions, but
comparing its use in the two areas of law helps students see what is at stake
beneath the language.28 More broadly, this comparison illustrates an important
phenomenon that students must grasp in order to succeed at lawyering—
learning to distinguish when and how words do actual analytical work.29
The discussion in both areas of law resonates with students as they see a
common concern for fairness: A defendant should usually not be held liable
for things beyond the defendant’s control. In personal jurisdiction, this
means that one cannot be brought to a forum unless one has voluntarily done
something to create a reasonable expectation of being haled into that court. In
tort law—particularly negligence—this means that a defendant cannot be liable
for harms that reach beyond what she should reasonably expect from the risks
she has voluntarily taken. Exceptions and exigencies temper the doctrine in
both areas of law, but between these is a concern that any student can relate to
if she has felt the anxiety of being named as a defendant in a lawsuit.30
27.

For example, due process is satisﬁed by “general jurisdiction” over a defendant, which for
corporate defendants lies (at least) in their states of incorporation and principal places
of business; yet liability for that defendant may not lie if the plaintiﬀ or the injury is not
foreseeable.

28.

A third form of foreseeability comes up in cases on respondeat superior. Arguably, this kind of
foreseeability draws together concepts from both torts and civil procedure. See, e.g., Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171–72 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting 2 FOWLER
V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 1376–78 (1956)) (“[W]hat is reasonably
foreseeable in this context . . . is quite a diﬀerent thing from the foreseeably unreasonable
risk of harm that spells negligence . . . . The foresight that should impel the prudent man
to take precautions is not the same measure as that by which he should perceive the harm
likely to ﬂow from his long-run activity in spite of all reasonable precautions on his own part
. . . . The employer should be held to expect risks, to the public also, which arise ‘out of and
in the course of’ his employment of labor. ”).

29.

First-year law students desperately need to be pushed beyond the cloak of language. Many
of them have learned as undergraduates to digest and regurgitate terminology without
challenging the meaning of the words. Disentangling and distinguishing foreseeability in
diﬀerent settings helps students engage in critical thinking.

30.

The concept also surfaces as a choice-of-law issue. Larry Kramer and others describe this
phenomenon as the Constitution protecting citizens from unfair surprise. See generally HERMA
HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS,
QUESTIONS (9th ed. 2013).
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C. Reasonable People Acting Unreasonably
Questions about objectivity and reasonableness make for great discussions
in torts and civil procedure courses. The combined course gave these issues
greater depth. By applying the reasonable person test (of torts) to decisions
the judge must make in dispositive motions before a jury verdict, we pushed
students to become more cognizant of the importance of the identity (and
potential biases) of the decision-maker. In addition, as students learned to
recognize the diﬀerence between questions of law and questions of fact, they
started to notice how often in the canonical torts cases jury questions are
decided, for better or worse, by a judge.
We teach students that, in theory, the reasonable person is a reﬂection of
what a community realistically (or perhaps wishfully) expects of its citizens.
In practice, however, the reasonable person inevitably absorbs some of the
presumptions and prejudices of the dominant culture. A related inconsistency
arises when students learn about a renewed motion for judgment as a matter
of law (JML). Students who seem to identify with juries more than judges are
appalled that the rules allow a judge to overturn a jury verdict if the judge
determines that no “reasonable” jury could have reached the verdict that the jury
just reached. The practical import of these doctrines can be brought together
with a series of questions: How can a judge know that no “reasonable” jury
could reach such a result? Does the “reasonable jury” reﬂect the same qualities
of the reasonable person in torts? Does the question of “reasonableness” serve
the same community-values function in both contexts?
A good place to raise these questions is when torts damages are discussed
within the context of juries, JML, and new trials. We have found success in
having students put damages analysis into practice by taking on the role of a
juror and, later, a judge. This exercise (discussed in greater detail below) gives
students a more complete picture of how the civil justice system functions
than they would have if torts and civil procedure were separate courses. The
procedural rules for JML and new trial are more meaningful when students
themselves have already come to a decision on the merits and must decide
whether a diﬀerent conclusion still qualiﬁes as reasonable. Students are able
to appreciate that these procedural devices diminish the right to jury trial.
This, in turn, can lead to a fruitful discussion of the powerful potential eﬀects
of race, gender, and other factors on what counts as reasonable.31 At the same
time, students are able to see the challenge juries face when attempting to
apportion damages and come up with a proper verdict.
D. Keeping Score
By the time law students are sitting anxiously in their seats on the ﬁrst day
of law school, they are already tainted with the assumption that litigation ends
31.

See Laura Gaston Dooley, Essay, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil
Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1994) (connecting the diminution of civil jury power through
devices like JMLs to the increasing diversiﬁcation of civil juries in terms of gender and race).

274

Journal of Legal Education

when one side wins and the other side loses.32 Students must learn to recognize
the signiﬁcant yet sometimes subtle meaning of procedural posture. We found
that we could more eﬀectively emphasize the importance of procedural posture
when students were studying civil procedure and torts in tandem.
From a merely practical standpoint, it is helpful for a professor teaching a
torts case to know how far the students have delved into the stages of litigation.
When we ask, “What is the procedural posture of this case?”, we know how far
we can push students to explain whether the court assumed certain facts to be
true for the sake of the motion, or whether those facts have been determined
to be true by a fact-ﬁnder, or whether they are still in dispute. The holding of a
case changes meaning when placed in procedural context. From here, one can
spin hypotheticals that test the extent of precedent.
Of course, students start reading torts cases before they fully understand
the signiﬁcance of procedural posture. It is necessarily an iterative process.
One advantage of putting torts and civil procedure together, we have found,
is that we can revisit procedural milestones again and again through the
semester, digging deeper into the meaning of the torts cases as students better
understand the stages of litigation. The many perspectives that bring meaning
to a case—from the diﬀerent views of the parties to the policies underlying the
legal doctrine—are harmonized as students better understand the parameters
of the motion that led to the court’s decision.
We also explain to students that in civil litigation the quintessential skill of a
lawyer is not the ability to make brilliant arguments but the ability to critically
analyze the strength of a client’s case.33 Because the great majority of cases
settle, litigators must make decisions about how far to go in litigation based
upon what they believe to be the merits of their case. Most torts litigation and
negotiation occurs in the shadow of the possibility of jury trial,34 based upon
assumptions about how the law might be interpreted in a given situation,
which facts can be proven, and how a decision-maker is likely to react to
the competing stories that the parties present. In this complex landscape of
facts, precedent, forum preferences, and unknown variables, students need to
understand how the procedural posture aﬀects the merits of a claim.
32.

This is, of course, wrong on many levels. From a therapeutic justice perspective, a case
may result in no winners or only winners, depending on how litigation aﬀects the parties.
From an economic and business perspective, victory must be calculated as the least costly
resolution, taking into account litigation costs and business reputation losses, as well as any
damages award. Finally, from a procedural perspective, the signiﬁcance of a ruling depends
largely on the litigation stage at which the court rendered its opinion. Thus, for example,
when a defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied, this is only a small “win” for the plaintiﬀ;
the plaintiﬀ may still lose on summary judgment or at trial. If the defendant’s motion to
dismiss is granted, on the other hand, the impact is greater.

33.

See STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS:
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 33–35 (4th ed.
2011).

34.

See Jeﬀrey Abramson, Second-Order Diversity Revisited, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 738, 776–77
(2014).
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IV. Pedagogic Integration: More Pain, More Gain
In addition to the signiﬁcant theoretical congruences involved in
integrating torts and civil procedure, we found the pedagogic techniques
we implemented yielded beneﬁts that were profound and systematic enough
to warrant ﬁnding ways to overcome the challenges. Some of the resulting
beneﬁts we encountered are intrinsic to (or, at a minimum, easier to implement
in) a course that combines torts and civil procedure. Others are not necessarily
tied to integration, but serve to stimulate student comprehension and help
students grow as independent, self-assessing learners.
As many legal education reformers have noted, “[t]here is substantial
literature establishing that providing students with context eﬀectively
promotes learning, as do active learning techniques and opportunities for
formative assessment.”35 As Professor Oppenheimer states, “Whether through
simulation or clinical practice, our colleagues who study learning theory
repeatedly urge us to use practical skills, context, and active learning as a
method of teaching the essential intellectual and cognitive skills described
by Shultz and Zedeck: analysis and reasoning, creativity and innovation,
problem-solving, and practical judgment.”36
The most immediate beneﬁt of using torts to teach procedure is that it
brings civil procedure into a realm that is more familiar and accessible to
ﬁrst-year students. This makes possible active, context-based learning that is
both deeper in analysis and more practical in application. We reinforced this
context-based learning by using frequent essay and multiple-choice formative
assessments, as well as practice-based exercises.
A. Silos Just Aren’t Sexy
As Professor Ho and colleagues have reminded us, “Studies show that
students are better able to learn and master concepts that they learn in
context, especially when learning in an integrated experience that mimics the
professional experience.”37 One reason context improves comprehension is
that it makes the material more interesting and accessible.38
Teaching civil procedure in the context of torts helps students overcome the
bewilderment that naturally occurs in a course that is in many ways alien to
the common experience of most ﬁrst-year students.39 To add to the challenge,
35.

See, e.g., Cynthia Ho, Angela Upchurch & Susan Gilles, An Active-Learning Approach to Teaching
Tough Topics: Personal Jurisdiction as an Example, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 772, 780 (2016).

36.

Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 820.

37.

Ho, Upchurch & Gilles, supra note 35, at 780 (footnote omitted).

38.

Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional Law Curriculum Through
Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 56–57 (2001).

39.

Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 817. (“Two big sources of student frustration [with civil
procedure] are (1) their inability to view the course materials in a context that makes
them seem real, and (2) our failure to engage them through active learning.”); see also Ho,
Upchurch & Gilles, supra note 35, at 777 (“The entire course of civil procedure is unusual
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many of the substantive law claims at issue in civil procedure cases invoke
topics reserved for second- or third-year study (e.g., securities regulation,
employment discrimination, and qualiﬁed immunity). Even the minimal—yet
necessary—attention to the divergent substantive contexts of these cases can
cause confusion and divert focus.
Teaching in context also helps the learner because it situates the subject
in a realm where the learner can more immediately and realistically practice
applying the subject.40 Neatly packaging areas of law into separate courses
results in at least two assumptions: ﬁrst, that legal problems will fall into only
one of these areas and not the others; and second, that clients will somehow
be able to identify for the lawyer what area of law is at issue (by saying, for
example, “I have a products liability claim”). In reality, clients frequently seek
assistance with problems that defy immediate categorization and often more
than one type of law is involved. Moreover, civil procedure questions rarely
show up on their own, and substantive torts issues require procedural action
to obtain relief. By placing the two subjects in a context that more accurately
tracks the way the subjects arise in the practice of law—that is, with substantive
and procedural law necessarily intertwined—students can envision and put
into practice the fundamental concepts of tort litigation.
We also aided students in understanding how legal analysis operates
in real-life lawsuits through a combination of discussing cases in the news,
administering combination torts/civil procedure essay questions stemming
from the same fact pattern, requiring the drafting of mock litigation
documents using torts scenarios, and taking time in class to raise torts aspects
of civil procedure cases and civil procedure aspects of torts cases. These
activities helped overcome some students’ misconception that civil procedure
involved only court documents and thus could not be tested in essay form,
and the more widespread struggle with distinguishing between the analysis
of torts problems (which tend to require an element-by-element inquiry)
and civil procedure problems (which often require an open-ended, step-bystep approach).41 To address students’ struggles with analytical diﬀerences
in that it focuses on processes and not events, things or relationships. It is diﬃcult for
students to visualize a process—especially when they have never participated in that process
or observed others engaged in it.”).
40.

See Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in
Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 317 (1994) (“The more a student becomes embedded
in context as a legal worker, the more she wrestles enactively with the problematic events
of the context, the more she subjects herself to the multiple forces of legal actors—clients,
colleagues, opponents, supervisors, support staﬀ, judges, or legislators—the more she . . .
functions within particular legal institutions and ‘behavior settings’—law oﬃces, courts, bar
associations, legislative bodies, and administrative agencies—the more she struggle [sic] to
construct a comprehensible story about her new way of life, the more mature, measured, and
eﬀective her education and her practice is likely to become.”).

41.

For example, in evaluating a claim for negligence, students must analyze each element of
the claim—duty, breach, cause in fact, proximate cause, and damages. In contrast, when
analyzing subject matter jurisdiction, the student should start with federal question
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we provided structural guides for essay question analysis after completing
course coverage of those topics. In addition, after administering our bar-type
essay formative assessments (discussed below), we provided the students with
very detailed rubrics (transparently revealing our expectations about how to
address both torts and civil procedure topics), reviewed the basic rubric in
class (as well as individually, on request), and required those who earned less
than a “passing” score to re-take the exam. We also subsequently put a model
answer on reserve in the library for students to check out and review. The
combination of this time and attention to proper and appropriate analysis for
topics in each subject generally yielded a substantially higher understanding
of both the substance and the appropriate analytical structure. In fact, calling
out the distinctions between element-by-element and step-by-step analysis
actually strengthened the ability of students to do both.
Putting torts and procedure in context also seemed to discourage
attitudinal barriers to student engagement. To their detriment, students tend
to make blanket decisions about not liking or understanding a whole body
of law—based primarily on their experience in a particular course. Taking a
meta approach to civil procedure and torts illustrates that both topics concern
representing clients to seek relief (or defend against it). And understanding
strategic consequences of both procedural and tort liability theory choices
broadens students’ perspectives. The world of civil litigation is deep and
wide, and while some concepts may be more accessible than others, viewing
the system as a whole helps students see it more realistically, making them
less likely to simply decide that they don’t like (or understand) an entire ﬁrstyear law topic. Avoiding such generalizations also leads to fewer self-defeating
attitudes when choosing upper-level courses, studying for the bar exam, and
making career decisions.
B. Skin in the Game
The research is clear that “[s]tudents’ ability to learn is promoted by active
rather than passive learning.”42 Active learning is deﬁned as “students taking
an active, more self-directed role in the learning process.”43 As Professor
Lustbader notes, “[h]elping students ‘own’ the concepts not only is necessary
as part of the cognitive process. It is essential in helping students resolve
dissonances of culture and values, cope with emotionally charged situations,
and feel a sense of inclusion.”44
We found that the synergy of teaching torts and civil procedure in one course
made it easier to create realistic situations that evoke active learning than if they
jurisdiction and proceed to diversity and supplemental jurisdiction only if federal question
is not satisﬁed.
42.

Ho, Upchurch & Gilles, supra note 35, at 782.

43.

Id.

44.

Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Students Learn, 48 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 402, 408 (1998).
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were taught separately. Many civil procedure teachers have reported success
having students learn through simulated litigation,45 and one of us has used
this approach for many years. This technique is eﬀective in large part because
it transports students from being outside observers of the law to being active
participants in the subject matter. As students become personally invested in
the outcome of the litigation, they engage more deeply with the materials.
Adding substantive tort doctrines into the simulation makes the exercise much
deeper and more practical: Students are not just thinking strategically about
the procedural tools and requirements; they are also scrutinizing the merits of
the underlying tort claims.
We used two recurring hypotheticals as simulations, one to introduce
students to the nuts and bolts of asserting a claim, and the other to work
strategically through the stages of a lawsuit as teams. The ﬁrst simulation
was based upon a strange case in which a woman allegedly died as a result
of a defective grocery bag.46 We introduced the facts of this simulation
when studying products liability in the ﬁrst semester of the course. Later in
the semester (after covering pleading), we assigned the students to draft a
complaint based on the fact pattern. This tested the students’ understanding of
products liability law as well as their ability to ﬁnd and apply the local rules for
drafting, ﬁling, and serving pleadings. More profoundly, the project provided
a concrete illustration of the dilemma litigators face in attempting to meet the
“Twiqbal” pleading standard.47 This pleading standard, which is mystifying
in the abstract and challenging in practice, becomes more comprehensible
when students apply it to a familiar substantive area of law.48 After students
ﬁled their complaints, we had students switch to the role of the defendant and
draft an answer to a randomly assigned complaint authored by one of their
colleagues. They learned how to draft an answer, as well as how to evaluate the
strength of potential aﬃrmative defenses we had studied.49
The next semester, we returned to the same fact scenario as we addressed
negligence, respondeat superior, and joinder. After adding more facts (purportedly
45.

See Oppenheimer, supra note 5, at 821–28.

46.

The fact scenario is derived from Amended Complaint, Freis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
13-cv-268 (D. Neb. Apr. 4, 2014), ECF No. 47, 2014 WL 1496287. In that case, plaintiﬀ
alleged that his wife was injured when her Walmart grocery bag broke and the contents
(including a large LaChoy can) fell on her right foot. The injury became infected, and
after several attempts to treat the infection, the woman died. Id. Our simulation renames
the plaintiﬀ, adds a number of facts, and relocates the incident. Therefore, we did not have
students review the pleadings from Freis.

47.

See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009).

48.

See Bartholomew, supra note 5 at 765–70, for another practical method for teaching this
standard.

49.

Students who struggle with the diﬀerence between a defense and an aﬃrmative defense in
torts are helped by a pleading drafting exercise: The complaint asserts the prima facie case
while the answer ﬁrst aﬃrms or denies the prima facie case and then—usually in a separate
section—alleges facts supporting aﬃrmative defenses.
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learned in discovery), we assigned the students to draft a motion to amend the
complaint from the ﬁrst term to name additional defendants and assert claims
based upon negligence and respondeat superior. This exercise required both a
review of the pleading and motion standards covered in the ﬁrst semester
and the ability to distinguish between the elements of products liability and
negligence. For many students who had struggled with one or more of these
topics, drafting these documents (and the feedback they received on them)
provided new clarity. And being required to succinctly and persuasively use
the facts to plead the elements of negligence gave structure to a tort that often
seems overwhelmingly complex and wide-ranging.
The second simulation we used was a negligence case based on a simple
car accident. We placed students in small teams (or “ﬁrms”), assigned each
to represent the plaintiﬀ or defendant, and had them take the case from
initial disclosures through discovery and to settlement negotiations near
the eve of trial. Each team was given a copy of the complaint and answer,
as well as a conﬁdential set of documents, which ultimately forced them to
evaluate the merits of their claims and make strategic decisions about how
to craft and respond to discovery requests.50 The mock lawsuit yielded a
number of pedagogical beneﬁts, but chief among them was the way it taught
the functional import of legal doctrines. Civil procedure professors and
litigators are fascinated by the use of strategy in litigating a case. Students,
however, rarely get to this level of enjoyment because they are so enmeshed in
learning what often seems to them arcane procedural rules. But by assigning
the students to “litigate” a mock negligence lawsuit (as well as other practical
exercises combining torts and civil procedure), our students were able to
appreciate the kinds of strategic choices and risks litigators encounter. For
example, when we covered in class a topic as putatively “boring” as the work
product doctrine, our students were fully engaged, since they knew it would
matter in terms of which documents they could withhold from the opposing
party when responding to discovery requests. Giving students the opportunity
to behave as real-life litigators (who can appreciate both the procedural and
substantive aspects of the case) during their ﬁrst year of study energized them
and enhanced their understanding and appreciation of the higher levels of
procedural practice.
C. Show Me the Money
Beyond full simulations, we looked for bridges that reinforced concepts
in one area of law while moving into a diﬀerent area. These often arose when
50.

We also gave them copies of some charts from Professor Woodley’s book on litigation in
federal court. ANN E. WOODLEY, LITIGATING IN FEDERAL COURT: A GUIDE TO THE RULES (2d
ed. 2014), pp. 62, 66–69, 82, 31–140, 159, 161. The students participated in discovery (initial
disclosures, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents), we conducted live
depositions of the plaintiﬀ and defendant during class (with the professors acting as counsel
and volunteer students playing the roles of the parties), and then they engaged in settlement
negotiations.
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discussing the procedural posture of a tort case.51 Having directly addressed
dispositive motions and the varying burdens, we were able to add teaching
moments in real time. While coverage concerns prevented full discussions
of civil procedure issues in every torts case (and vice versa), we strategically
used this technique of looping back to previously covered procedural topics
and foreshadowing those yet to come. 52 For example, after studying summary
judgment, we paused during the coverage of a tort issue raised by summary
judgment to explore the procedural context and compare it with other
procedural mechanisms. Students were able to recognize that the procedural
context and the decision-maker could have a signiﬁcant impact on the results.
The most fruitful exercises, however, were ones that brought together torts
and civil procedure concepts that are intrinsically linked in practice. The
study of juries, JML, and new trials, for example, has greater meaning when
placed in the context of tort damages, including comparative fault. Using the
famous McDonald’s hot coﬀee case, which tends to evoke strong opinions and
challenge popular misconceptions,53 we had the students work through each
of these procedural mechanisms by moving between playing the role of the
jury and the role of the judge.
First, after discussing comparative fault and the various types of damages, we
put the students into groups that functioned as juries, and had them deliberate
on the apportionment of liability among the parties. Students were required
to reach a verdict on the percentage of fault attributable to each party. Then,
after debrieﬁng the ﬁrst jury experience and polling students for their various
verdicts, we gave the them a (partially ﬁctional) breakdown of the harms
plaintiﬀ suﬀered and a second verdict form that required students to assess the
appropriate compensation for the plaintiﬀ’s various harms—including medical
expenses, pain and suﬀering, and lost wages. After the juries deliberated,
we once again polled the class and debriefed the way students calculated
51.

Early in the course, we used an active-learning exercise to introduce the stages of litigation.
We put the class in groups and gave each group a set of strips of paper—each of which
had a litigation stage typed on it—and had the groups race to put the strips of paper in the
proper order (and be able to explain why). Particularly for kinesthetic learners, this exercise
was enlightening, and it formed the foundation for later discussions about the procedural
posture of each case.

52.

This is consistent with the “spiral curriculum” approach. See Maranville, supra note 38, at
61–62; Paul Maharg, Professional Legal Education in Scotland, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 947, 960
(2004).

53.

Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated sub nom, Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No.
CV-93-02419 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994), 1994 WL 16777704. This case, in which Liebeck
claimed McDonald’s sold coﬀee that was far too hot, became famous during tort reform
campaigns in the 1990s. See, e.g., John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The
Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1053 n.148 (2005). The case was
later the subject of a documentary ﬁlm. HOT COFFEE (HBO 2013). The facts of the case—
and the court’s remittitur reducing the punitive damages to under $500,000—often come
as a surprise to students. See Grant H. Morris, Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational
Experience of First-Year Law Students, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465, 511–12 (2010).
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the damages—always an enlightening perspective into how jury verdicts can
diverge.54
Next, we had the students play the role of a judge. We gave them examples
of various (ﬁctional) verdicts on the hot coﬀee case—some self-contradicting,
some clearly one-sided, and some that fell more toward the center. We had
them assume that a party had moved for a renewed JML or, in the alternative,
for a new trial. For each verdict, the student judges had to decide whether to
let the verdict stand as is, grant a renewed motion for JML, or grant a new
trial. As students explained their rulings, they were able to see where their
ideas of reasonableness on the underlying tort diverged from or merged with
others in the class. Procedural devices like JML and new trial look diﬀerent
when “reasonableness” is revealed as an unknown quality. Adding to this,
students saw that the amount of damages (as well as apportionment of fault)
can vary drastically based upon the decision-maker. As students experienced
the practical interaction of torts and procedure, they better appreciated the
subtle and often conﬂicting roles of the lawyers, the decision-makers, and the
rule of law.
D. Bar Prep, Issue Spotting, and True Grit
One risk of moving back and forth between two areas of law is that students
will have a lapse in concentration and thereby miss the transition from one
subject to the next. To decrease the risk of this—and as part of a general desire
to infuse bar-style assessments into our teaching—we gave students frequent
bar-style assessments, some of which were graded and others that were purely
formative.
During both semesters, we gave students several practice multiple-choice
and essay questions, weekly multiple-choice quizzes, midterm and ﬁnal exams,
and separate bar essay quizzes taken under timed conditions. The bar quizzes
were modeled after the Uniform Bar Exam Multistate Essay Examination
(MEE) questions. We graded each bar essay using a detailed rubric that
included both individual points (with comments) and an overall MEE score
(using the bar exam grading scale of 1-6). After completing the grading, we
provided each student with his or her completed rubric, and reviewed the quiz
in class. While the rubric did not include the answers, it was a transparent
model of the order and type of analysis we were seeking. In order to “pass”
a bar quiz, students had to earn an MEE score of at least a 3.55 If a student
earned a 3 or higher the ﬁrst time she took the essay quiz, we bumped up her
score by 0.5—in order to encourage students to put all of their eﬀort into the
ﬁrst attempt. Students who did not pass initially had to re-take the same quiz
54.

We also tinkered with the structure of the juries for this exercise. Size matters (or does it?):
Does a twelve-person jury function diﬀerently than a six-person jury? What happens when
you switch from unanimity to a supermajority rule for decision-making?

55.

It is our understanding that in order to pass the MEE, bar takers must earn a combination
of 3s and 4s on their essays. Presentation by former Arizona Supreme Court Justice Rebecca
A. Berch.
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at a later date, again under exam-like conditions, having had the beneﬁt of
reviewing their completed grading rubric. The highest score a student could
get on a re-take was a 3.
The integration of two subjects in our assessments honed analytical skills
in a way that we hope will aid our students both on the bar exam and in
practice. Through assessments, discussions, and exercises, the broad scope
of the course pushed students to master contextual issue spotting. Since we
usually did not identify the subject areas of these questions in advance, the
students were forced to identify whether torts or civil procedure was being
tested before drilling down into analysis. We taught them to next identify the
particular subtopic being tested, and then to apply an IRAC analysis (for both
multiple-choice and essay questions). This critical bar examination skill of
identifying the subject being tested was thus introduced in the ﬁrst year, rather
than the typical model of waiting until the third year or postgraduate bar prep.
In addition, since most substantive law questions are raised through a speciﬁc
procedural device, and most procedural questions will have to be introduced
in the context of some type of substantive law, the ability to determine the area
of law at issue is key to bar exam success. With this type of expertise, students
are less likely to be distracted by the phrase “summary judgment” when the
question is really about an intentional tort, or, conversely, by a substantive law
background discussion when the pertinent issue actually involves procedure.
In addition, this higher-level issue-spotting skill is of great value in law practice
when more than one area of law applies to a client’s problem.
Aside from the beneﬁts of frequent feedback and opportunities for selfassessment, the number of assessments and their scoring also aimed to
develop student “grit.” Although deﬁned in various ways in research and in
Hollywood, grit is essentially the ability to persevere when faced with setbacks
and challenges.56 Thus, “[g]rit entails working strenuously toward challenges,
maintaining eﬀort and interest over years despite failure, adversity, and plateaus
in progress.”57 Research suggests that grit is sometimes more important than
IQ for high achievement.58 By requiring students to re-take essay quizzes that
scored below passing, we encouraged students to push through the inevitable
failures of law school and reengage hard subjects. Students were encouraged
to review their essays with the professors and TAs until they learned how to
self-assess their essays. Although not all students reached this goal, we did
notice markedly better structural integrity on the ﬁnal essay exams, as well as
on the other hypotheticals and exercises during the course. Finally, we also
allowed students to “earn back” missed points on their weekly multiple-choice
quizzes by answering a certain portion of practice multiple-choice question
56.

See generally Angela L. Duckworth, Christopher Peterson, Michael D. Matthews & Dennis R.
Kelly, Grit: Perseverance and Passion for Long-Term Goals, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1087,
1087–88 (2007).

57.

Id. at 1088.

58.

Id. at 1089; see also generally ANGELA DUCKWORTH, GRIT: THE POWER
PERSEVERANCE (2016).
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quizzes correctly. This encouraged them to do more practice questions than
they otherwise would have on their own and to take them seriously.
E. Too Big to Fail
An unexpected beneﬁt of the course was that the number of credits allotted
to it (ﬁve per semester), and the fact that we spent so much time in class with
our students, heightened the level of attention students paid to the course. In
fact, the course almost had a “homeroom” feel to it, and we got to know our
students very well. We also had the time and the opportunity to create more
links between topics covered in contiguous classes. On the down side, because
of the high number of credits, the grades in this course had a disproportionate
impact on students’ ﬁrst-year grade point averages—and thus their ability to
achieve or retain a particular class rank, retain their scholarships, and remain
in good academic standing. Although the ﬁnal grade in each course was based
on many factors (and not just a single ﬁnal exam), its disproportionate impact
is still a concern. One possible solution to this problem is to award four credits
for the substantive portion of the course and one credit for the “practicum”
portion.
Finally, another area of both opportunity and challenge was that we had to
create materials to teach this course. Since we wanted to avoid students having
to purchase two separate casebooks, we created a custom casebook through
Aspen’s Custom Publishing Series (quickly combining materials from other
texts).59 While putting parts of multiple casebooks together in the same text—
with minimal editing—served our purposes starting out, the course would work
better and be less demanding of faculty if we had more nuanced materials.
V. The Future of Civil Litigation: To Form a More Perfect Union
If anything here has piqued your interest, we urge those of you willing and able
to jump fully into the innovation of a combined course, with its potentialities
and risks, to take the leap. But the good news is that even for teachers who
are unconvinced that such an approach is preferable, or constrained by the
curricular structures of their institutions, many of the beneﬁts described
above can be realized without formal integration of the courses. Indeed, one
of the most pleasurable and exciting consequences of our journey has been
coordinating closely with colleagues and learning from one another. In a law
school whose ﬁrst-year curriculum follows the traditional model, torts and
civil procedure professors can work together to include readings and exercises
59.
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in their respective courses that serve to cross-pollinate the learning process and
lead to the beneﬁts we have witnessed. And even a lone wolf can use many of
these ideas in a traditional torts or procedure course to help deepen students’
understanding in ways that improve both bar preparation and practice.
The marriage of torts and civil procedure works (to the extent it does work)
because of the connections and comparisons that naturally manifest in litigating
a torts case. To emulate and teach this, we have used a mix of materials from
torts and civil procedure casebooks, exercises that we have developed ourselves,
and pleadings from litigated cases. Our decision to use a custom casebook was
to some degree borne of a limited time frame to structure the course, and of
our desire to ensure that our new structure would not undercut our students’
exposure to all the key coverage they should rightly expect from their ﬁrst-year
torts and civil procedure courses. We routinely supplemented the materials in
the custom casebook, which borrowed materials from traditional casebooks
in wide use in the academy, with exercises and questions that we produced or
that were available in the public domain via bar examiners’ websites and the
like.
This, as might be imagined, turned out to be a lot of work, and led to some
challenges. We have contemplated what would improve the course: a casebook
that integrates torts and civil procedure from page one. This book would
deliberately infuse adult learning theory by focusing on context-based, active
learning and frequent formative assessment. It would, for example, introduce
civil litigation as a body of law that is both strategic and doctrinal, ordered by
processes and doctrines that derive from our federal system of government. It
would gather cases that—either in one opinion or through case history—teach
compatible torts and civil procedure topics using the same fact pattern. And it
would include problems and exercises that help students connect past topics
to new ones as they complete activities pulled directly from contemporary law
practice.
Would such a casebook ﬁnd a wider audience? Legal publishers would
be understandably hesitant to support a book that is made for such a
nontraditional course. While there may be some ways around this market
challenge, it reﬂects a larger problem facing legal education: Dramatic shifts in
the law school curriculum are easy to imagine but hard to execute. Particularly
when attempting to rethink the ﬁrst year, we are, to some extent, held hostage
by history. The myriad casebooks are keyed to the standard ﬁrst-year courses;
students tend to expect the usual courses and their venerable casebooks;
and the small, uncertain market to teach radically diﬀerent courses creates a
powerful disincentive for faculty to invest time in developing such courses.
The tail of tradition wags the curricular dog.
For us, the answer to this market failure is blind persistence and (perhaps
unfounded) optimism. We started our noble experiment in the hope that we
could better prepare our students for the practice of law. We found, to our
delight, that it also made us better professors. This happy consequence was
not inevitable. Simply combining two traditional subjects without thoughtful
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integration would no doubt have been less work, but also would have done
little to open our own eyes to the pedagogic possibilities. Signiﬁcantly, we
were pushed to look beyond our individual ways of thinking about the legal
universe to embrace a broader perspective. Of course, the experiment is
ongoing. We invite you to join us in our eﬀorts to make law school a more
realistic and deeper experience for today’s law student.

